By: Dr Mohamed Ibrahim Justice Ganawah, Senior Lecturer – University of Sierra Leone (FBC)
(Guest Writer)
As Sierra Leone steps into 2026, it is important to pause and reflect not on the plans we have drawn, the speeches we have delivered, or the promises we have made but on the results we have achieved. The truth is, rhetoric without enforcement, promises without accountability, and plans without follow-through have become recurring themes in our national discourse.
We cannot continue to measure progress by the number of policies passed, committees established, or reports filed. Progress is measured by results: stronger institutions, improved services, better living standards, and trust between the state and its people. This requires not just good ideas, but genuine reformers—leaders who have the courage, discipline, and integrity to enforce rules, confront vested interests, and prioritise long-term national development over short-term gains.
1. The Challenge of Weak Institutions and Fragmented Governance
Sierra Leone has made progress in several areas public financial management, decentralisation, revenue administration, and procurement reforms are examples of positive intent. Yet, these reforms remain incomplete. Institutions continue to face challenges such as:
a. Selective enforcement of rules: Laws exist, but they are applied inconsistently.
b. Weak sanctions: Non-performance and corruption are rarely punished.
c. Politicisation of appointments and promotions: Meritocracy is often overshadowed by connections.
d. Limited monitoring and evaluation: Decisions are rarely guided by real-time data and evidence.
Economic history and political economy research confirm that institutions without enforcement capacity cannot constrain behaviour (North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009). In such environments, formal rules coexist with informal patronage networks. The consequence is predictable: low productivity, discouraged investment, and reduced public trust.
Globally, countries that have faced similar institutional fragility but transformed successfully offer lessons. Georgia under Mikheil Saakashvili (2004–2012) eliminated widespread petty corruption by digitising public services and enforcing accountability. Estonia developed a robust digital governance system that curtailed bureaucratic discretion and created predictable administrative outcomes (World Bank, 2020). These examples show that enforcement, transparency, and accountability are not optional; they are prerequisites for development.
2. Genuine Reformers: The Heart of Sustainable Change
Institutional reform alone is insufficient. Historical evidence shows that meaningful change rarely occurs without genuine reformers—leaders who can:
i. Enforce rules consistently.
ii. Confront entrenched interests;
iii. Protect institutions from capture;
iv. Prioritise long-term development over short-term political gain.
These reformers are not authoritarian figures. They derive their power from credibility, discipline, and reform intent, not fear.
Examples from around the world illustrate this:
a. Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore) institutionalised meritocracy and zero tolerance for corruption, laying the foundation for rapid industrialisation and high-quality public service (Quah, 2010).
b. Meles Zenawi (Ethiopia) built a disciplined bureaucracy and implemented coordinated state-led development, resulting in decades of high growth (Arkebe Oqubay, 2015).
c. Paul Kagame (Rwanda) enforced performance contracts (Imihigo) and strict public sector discipline, transforming Rwanda’s governance and service delivery systems (Chemouni, 2018).
d. Jerry Rawlings (early Ghana) restored state discipline and fiscal order, rescuing a collapsed system from total dysfunction (Herbst, 2014).
For Sierra Leone, 2026 and beyond requires genuine reformers at all levels: in the executive, civil service, regulatory agencies, academia, and state-owned enterprises. Without them, even the best policy frameworks risk becoming symbolic, reversible, and ineffective.
3. Capacity of Public Sector Workers and Education System
Institutional reform is tightly linked to the capacity of public sector workers. In Sierra Leone, human resource constraints remain a major bottleneck:
a. Many civil servants lack the technical and managerial skills required for effective policy implementation.
b. Weak capacity in procurement, planning, and revenue administration leads to inefficiency and fiscal leakage.
c. Training programs are often ad hoc, underfunded, and misaligned with national development priorities.
Investing in human capital within the public sector is essential. Rwanda, for example, introduced continuous professional development and performance-based management for civil servants, dramatically improving service delivery (Chemouni, 2018).
Similarly, Singapore invested in highly trained, motivated public servants under Lee Kuan Yew, ensuring bureaucratic discipline and meritocracy (Quah, 2010).
The education system in Sierra Leone also requires attention:
a. Learning outcomes remain low despite higher enrolment.
b. Skills mismatches limit employability and constrain productivity.
c. Credential inflation qualifications not matched by competence, undermines trust in the public sector.
Reforms must focus on quality education, technical and vocational training, and alignment with labour market demands. Countries such as South Korea and Vietnam demonstrate that investing in human capital is central to long-term growth and industrialisation (Woo-Cumings, 1999)
4. The Elite Bargain: Aligning Interests for Development
Professor Stefan Dercon, in Gambling on Development (2022), underscores a crucial insight: development accelerates when countries establish a credible elite bargain. This means an agreement among political and economic elites to restrain predatory behaviour and support growth-enhancing policies.
Dercon identifies four core elements of this bargain:
1. Leadership committed to growth;
2. Elites willing to accept constraints on rent extraction;
3. Institutions that reward productive investment and compliance;
4. Credible expectations of policy continuity.
Countries that have successfully leveraged an elite bargain include:
i. South Korea in the 1960s–1980s: political elites agreed to protect industrial policy while allowing the state to enforce accountability and long-term investment (Woo-Cumings, 1999).
ii. Vietnam post-1986 (Đổi Mới): reform-oriented elites created predictable economic rules and liberalised the market while protecting key state institutions.
iii. Rwanda under Kagame: elite consensus prioritised state capacity and rule enforcement over individual enrichment.
iv. Ethiopia under Zenawi: political elites coordinated to prioritise state-led industrial development over rent-seeking.
Sierra Leone, in contrast, suffers from a fragmented elite settlement. Political competition often revolves around access to resources rather than national productivity. Without a credible elite bargain, reforms remain fragile, rules are applied inconsistently, and institutions are vulnerable to capture.
5. Policy Objectives: Moving From Rhetoric to Results (2026–2030)
To achieve measurable progress, Sierra Leone must adopt clear, long-term objectives:
1. Strengthen institutional enforcement and predictability to ensure rules are applied consistently.
2. Empower genuine reformers to drive institutional change and protect policy implementation.
3. Consolidate a growth-oriented elite bargain that aligns incentives around productivity, investment, and accountability.
4. Improve productivity and human capital through education reforms, skills alignment, and public sector efficiency.
5. Restore public trust and state legitimacy, ensuring citizens see the value of compliance, governance, and national cohesion.
6. Policy Recommendations
6.1 Executive and Political Leadership
a. Signal zero tolerance for institutional capture and selective rule enforcement.
b. Provide political protection for genuine reformers within Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs).
c. Establish a Presidential Reform Delivery and Enforcement Unit with authority to track outcomes, enforce accountability, and report progress publicly.
6.2 Public Sector and Institutions
a. Enforce merit-based recruitment, promotion, and deployment.
b. Introduce binding performance contracts for senior officials, modeled on Rwanda’s Imihigo system.
c. Strengthen sanctions for corruption, non-performance, and unethical behaviour.
6.3 Building the Elite Bargain
a. Foster cross-party consensus on protecting key institutions, including the NRA, Audit Service, Judiciary, and Statistics Sierra Leone.
b. Reduce discretionary rents through digitisation and regulatory simplification (Georgia and Estonia offer models for success).
c. Align elite incentives toward investment, compliance, and long-term productivity.
6.4 Education and Human Capital
a. Restore academic standards and eliminate tolerance for academic malpractice or credential inflation.
b. Align tertiary education and vocational training with market demands and national development priorities.
c. Promote applied policy research and partnerships between universities and government to inform reform design.
6.5 Private Sector and Civil Society
a. Reward compliant firms through predictable regulatory enforcement.
b. Improve tax morale by linking visible service delivery to revenue collection.
c. Strengthen transparency, civic accountability, and participatory governance mechanisms.
7. Expected Outcomes
If implemented consistently, Sierra Leone can anticipate:
a. Stronger institutions capable of enforcing rules and delivering services effectively.
b. Improved service delivery, particularly in education, healthcare, and local governance.
c. Higher productivity and private investment due to predictable economic rules and reduced rent-seeking.
d. Increased public trust and legitimacy as citizens witness enforcement, accountability, and fairness.
e. Sustained and inclusive economic growth through coordinated policy action, genuine reformers, and a credible elite bargain.
8. Conclusion
Sierra Leone’s development challenge is fundamentally institutional and political. The country has a clear blueprint for progress, but the gap between plans and results persists. Lessons from Singapore, Rwanda, Ethiopia, South Korea, Georgia, and Estonia demonstrate that strong institutions, genuine reformers, and credible elite bargains are non-negotiable prerequisites for sustainable development.
As we move forward in 2026, the decisive question is whether Sierra Leone is prepared to move from rhetoric to enforcement, from execution plans, and from fragmentation to a credible national development bargain. The future of our nation depends not on speeches or intentions, but on results, discipline, and the courage to enforce them.
Let us embrace reformers, support accountability, and insist on leadership that prioritises the collective good over personal gain. The time for transformative action is now.
References:
Arkebe Oqubay (2015). Made in Africa: Industrial Policy in Ethiopia. Oxford University Press.
Chemouni, B. (2018). Explaining the design of the Rwandan decentralization: Elite control, institutional adaptation, and the management of conflict. Journal of Eastern African Studies.
Dercon, S. (2022). Gambling on Development: Why Some Countries Win, and Others Lose. University of Chicago Press.
Hanushek, E., & Woessmann, L. (2015). The Knowledge Capital of Nations: Education and the Economics of Growth. MIT Press.
Herbst, J. (2014). States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Development. Princeton University Press.
North, D., Wallis, J., & Weingast, B. (2009). Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge University Press.
Quah, J. (2010). Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream? Ashgate Publishing.
Woo-Cumings, M. (1999). The Developmental State. Cornell University Press.
World Bank (2020). Digital Government and Service Delivery: Global Lessons.